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SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO. V. SAN DIEGO COUNTY
DISTRICT COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS:
THE DEMISE OF FEDERAL
PREEMPTION OF LABOR
DISPUTES
The National Labor Relations Board, with certain exceptions,
has exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes involving union ac-
tivity which the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
may either protect or prohibit. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San
Diego County District Council of Carpenters, the United States
Supreme Court excepted from this doctrine of federal preemption
labor disputes involving peaceful trespassory union activity.
This Comment examines the Sears decision and its impact and
concludes that although the decision purports to create only an
exception to the doctrine offederal preemption, the Sears excep-
tion undermines the very purpose and efficacy of the doctrine it-
self.
INTRODUCTION
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,l the United
States Supreme Court held that the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) has exclusive jurisdiction over labor union activity
arguably protected by section 7 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act2 or arguably prohibited by section 8 of the Act. In order
1. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
2. The Pullman strikes of 1893 prompted Congress to enact the first compre-
hensive body of federal labor law. See Erdman Act, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898)
(held unconstitutional in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)). In 1926 Con-
gress enacted the Railway Labor Act which sanctioned and codified union-man-
agement bargaining. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926). In 1936, Congress extended the
coverage of the Railway Labor Act to interstate air carriers. Ch. 166, 49 Stat. 1189
(1936).
The Clayton Act constitutes Congress' first major attempt to regulate labor rela-
tions in the noncarrier field. Ch. 323, §§ 6, 20, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976)). Section 6 of the Clayton Act provided that
federal antitrust law should not be construed to prohibit the existence of labor or-
ganizations. Section 20 of the Act barred federal courts from issuing injunctions in
labor disputes. However, the United States Supreme Court lessened the impact of
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to avoid state conflict with comprehensive national labor policies,
Garmon established a broad doctrine of federal preemption of la-
bor disputes. 3 However, the Court has created numerous excep-
tions to Garmon since the doctrine's most complete expression in
1959. 4
In 1978, the Supreme Court created perhaps the greatest excep-
tion to Garmon: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dis-
trict Council of Carpenters.5 In Sears, the Court found Garmon
inapplicable to labor disputes involving union picketing which
violated state trespass law. The broad principles enunciated in
Sears may wholly undermine the concept of federal preemption
of labor disputes.
This Comment considers the impact of the Sears decision.
First, the Garmon doctrine and the doctrine's exceptions prior to
Sears are outlined, followed by a discussion of the federal pre-
emption issues raised by trespassory union activity. Finally, the
Sears decision and its ramifications are analyzed.
the Clayton Act by restrictively applying its provisions. See Bedford Cut Stone
Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
Congress, in response to the Supreme Court's emasculation of the Clayton Act,
enacted the Norris-La Guardia Act. Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976)). The primary purpose of the Norris-La Guardia Act was
to ensure that federal courts were prohibited from enjoining coercive union activ-
ity that did not involve fraud or violence.
The current National Labor Relations Act is the primary body of federal law
controlling labor-management relations in private industry. The Act is the result
of a three-stage legislative process. In 1935 Congress enacted the National Labor
Relations (Wagner) Act (NLRA) which had two primary purposes: 1) to establish
certain employee rights and 2) to impose affirmative obligations on employers to
bargain collectively. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1976)).
In 1947, Congress amended the NLRA by enacting the Labor-Management Rela-
tions (Taft-Hartley) Act (LMRA). Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-187 (1976). The LMRA established unfair union la-
bor practices. In 1959, Congress again amended the NLRA by enacting the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act (LMRDA). Pub. L.
No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (current version in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.
(1976)). The LMRDA generally sought to 1) regulate internal union affairs, 2) es-
tablish a "Bill of Rights" for union members, and 3) further define unfair union
labor practices. R. GORMAN, LABOR LAw: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING 1-6 (1976) provides a concise, valuable discussion of the historical development
of the NLRA.
3. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The power
of the federal government to preempt state jurisdiction over labor disputes is
based on the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art.
VI. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See also Retail Clerks Lo-
cal 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
4. See text accompanying notes 19-44 infa. See geneally Hooton, The Excep-
tional Garmon Doctrine, 26 LAB. L.J. 49 (1975).
5. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
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PRE-SEARS PREEMPTION
The Garmon Doctrine
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended by the
Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA) and the Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), implicitly cre-
ates three types of union activity potentially subject to federal
preemption. First, sections 76 and 8(a) (1)7 of the NLRA create
protected activity. Second, section 8(b) creates prohibited activ-
ity.8 The third type of activity is that which sections 7 and 8(a) (1)
do not protect and which section 8(b) does not prohibit.9 A series
of Supreme Court decisions during the 1940s and 1950s laid the in-
itial foundation for federal preemption of labor disputes. The gen-
eral rule evolved that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction over
labor disputes involving union activity which the NLRA clearly
protected or prohibited.'0 Garmon focused on arguably protected
or arguably prohibited activities.
6. Section 7 provides that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .. .
NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
7. Section 8(a) (1) provides that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of the title .... " Id. § 8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1) (1976).
8. In general, § 8(b) of the NLRA prohibits a union from 1) interfering with
employees' § 7 rights, 2) engaging in secondary boycotts and strikes, and 3) engag-
ing in recognitional picketing. Id. § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
9. NLRA §§ 7, 8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1976). See Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955). A gap lies between §§ 7 and 8(a)(1) and the unfair labor
practices prohibited by § 8(b) in which labor and management are "free to fight
out their differences with economic weapons unrestricted by federal law." Cox,
Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1337, 1346 (1972).
10. Decisions reflecting the development of the doctrine of federal preemption,
in chronological order, are Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Re-
lations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (threats of violence not governed by the NLRA and
thus could not be enjoined); Hill v. Florida ex rel Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945)
(striking down state law because it interfered with § 7 rights); Bethlehem Steel
Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947) (potential conflict
between state and federal labor policy sufficient reason to preclude state action);
U.A.W. Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949), over-
ruled, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 155 (1976) (union activity classified as being within the juris-
diction of either the NLRB or the state courts); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346
U.S. 485 (1953) (state courts could not enjoin peaceful picketing subject to the ju-
risdiction of the NLRB to prevent unfair labor practices, even if state courts were
to apply a substantive rule of state law identical to federal law).
In Garmon, the Supreme Court held that the state and federal
courts must defer to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB if an
adjudication involves labor activity arguably subject to sections 7
and 8 of the NLRA.I The Court concluded that Congress in-
tended to establish a uniform national labor policy.12 The Court
recognized that in order to achieve this goal Congress had en-
trusted the administration of the NLRA to the NLRB, a central-
ized administrative agency armed with its own procedure and
equipped with specialized knowledge and cumulated experi-
ence.1 3 Furthermore, the Court recognized that if labor disputes
were litigated in multiple tribunals, each with its own diverse pro-
cedure, incompatible or conflicting adjudications would result,
thereby disrupting Congress' goal of uniform federal labor pol-
icy.14
The Garmon court indicated that state courts might have juris-
diction over disputes involving union activity which the NLRA
neither protected nor prohibited.15 However, the Court's decision
precludes state courts from making the initial determination
where the union's activity is arguably subject to the NLRA.10 The
NLRB has primary jurisdictionl7 to characterize the union's activ-
ity. Only if the NLRB makes a clear determination that the NLRA
does not protect or prohibit the activity can a state exercise its ju-
11. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244-45. Professor
Howard Lesnick states that the approach taken under Garmon is as follows:
(1) If conduct is protected under section 7 or prohibited under section 8,
there is preemption because federal law regulates the conduct and
concurrent state regulation is not permitted;
(2) if the conduct is neither protected nor prohibited, there is no pre-
emption because the conduct is not federally regulated; but
(3) if the conduct is "arguably" protected or prohibited, there is preemp-
tion because only the NLRB (subject to appellate review) can adjudi-
cate questions under the Act, and thus determine whether the
conduct in fact falls within proposition 1 or proposition 2.
Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72
COLUM. L. REv. 469, 472 (1972).
12. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 242-43 (quoting Gar-
ner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953)). See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1976). See also NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971).
13. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 242.
14. Id. at 246. See Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
15. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245.
16. Id. See also NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971); Hanna Mining
Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965).
17. The term primary jurisdiction refers to "the various considerations articu-
lated in Garmon and its progeny that militate in favor of preempting state court
jurisdiction over activity which is subject to the unfair labor practice jurisdiction
of the federal board." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 199 n.29 (1978). But see 3 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 19.01 (1958) (Primary jurisdiction governs only the question whether
the courts or an agency will initially decide an issue, not whether the courts or
the agency will make the final decision).
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risdiction to adjudicate the dispute.18 Thus, the Garmon Court
established a broad doctrine of federal preemption of labor dis-
putes.
Exceptions to the Garmon Doctrine
The courts, Congress, and the NLRB have continually created
exceptions to the Garmon doctrine. There are three major judi-
cial exceptions.19 The Supreme Court created the first two in the
Garmon decision itself.
First, the Court exempted from the doctrine of federal preemp-
tion disputes involving matters of "peripheral concern" to the
NLRA.20 The Court reasoned that exercise of state jurisdiction
over matters of peripheral concern poses only a minimal threat to
national labor policy.2 ' Matters considered to be of peripheral
concern have generally related to purely internal union affairs,
such as a union member's suit to recover damages and for rein-
statement to union membership when the member was allegedly
expelled in violation of the union's bylaws.2 2
18. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246.
19. There is one minor judicial exception that should be noted. In Hanna Min-
ing Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965), the
Supreme Court indicated that if only a minor aspect of the controversy presented
to the state court is arguably within the regulatory jurisdiction of the NLRB, Gar-
mon should not be read to require preemption of state jurisdiction. Id. at 192-93.
20. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243. See Keen v.
Operating Eng'rs Local 624, 569 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1978); Universal Communica-
tions Corp. v. Burns, 449 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1971).
21. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243. But see Steele
v. Brewery & Soft Drink Workers Local 1162, 432 F. Supp. 369 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
22. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958) (The
NLRB cannot interfere with a union's right to establish its own membership rule.
The Supreme Court upheld the state's power to award damages and compel rein-
statement.). See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973) (reasonableness of union
fines a matter for the state courts). Compare International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), with Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Bor-
den, 373 U.S. 690 (1963), and Iron Workers Local 207 v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963)
(union interference with existing or prospective employment rather than internal
union matters; no specific claim for restoration of membership to which an award
of damages could be subordinated).
The Supreme Court over the past two decades has consistently narrowed the
peripheral concern exception to Garmon. In Amalgamated Ass'n of Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), the Supreme Court all but overruled
Gonzales. The Court stated that the determination of the issue in Lockridge re-
quired construction of the relevant union security clauses, but in Gonzales it re-
quired merely an interpretation of the union's constitution and bylaws. The result
of the Lockridge decision is the increased preemption of cases involving internal
union affairs. For a valuable discussion of the significance of the Lockridge deci-
Second, the Garmon Court created an exception for labor dis-
putes involving state interests with "deeply rooted local feeling
and responsibility."2 3 The Court will not infer that Congress has
deprived states of the power to act with respect to such matters
absent an express congressional intention to the contrary.2 4 The
Court has long recognized a state's compelling interest in labor
disputes involving violence,2 5 threats of violence, 26 and mass pick-
eting.2 7 State courts through their police powers may grant in-
junctions to restrain such conduct even though the conduct would
constitute an unfair labor practice under the NLRA.28 In addition
to violence, threats of violence, and mass picketing, the Court has
more recently recognized a state's deeply rooted interest in labor
disputes involving malicious defamation 29 and intentional inflic-
tion of mental distress.30
In Vaca v. Sipes,3 1 the Supreme Court created a third judicial
exception to Garmon for labor disputes in which state adjudica-
tion would promote rather than interfere with federal labor pol-
icy. In Vaca, the Court upheld a state's jurisdiction over a union
member's suit in which the member sought damages and injunc-
tive relief under state law for breach of a union's duty of fair rep-
resentation.32 The Court concluded that the union's activity
constituted an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. Neverthe-
less, the Court held that the NLRA did not preempt state jurisdic-
tion since application of the state law would promote rather than
interfere with Congress' goal of a uniform national labor policy.33
sion with respect to the vitality of the Garmon doctrine, see Lesnick, Preemption
Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 CoLUl . L. RE v. 469
(1972).
23. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
24. Id.
25. See UA.W. v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956). See also Mountain Navigation Co., Inc. v.
Searfarers' Int'l Union, 348 F. Supp. 1298 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
26. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
See also Genesco, Inc. v. United Shoe Workers, 230 F. Supp. 923 (N.D.N.Y. 1964),
affd, 341 F.2d 482 (2nd Cir. 1965).
27. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957). But see Genesco, Inc. v.
United Shoe Workers, 230 F. Supp. 923 (N.D.N.Y. 1964), affid, 341 F.2d 482 (2nd Cir.
1965).
28. See notes 25-27 supra.
29. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (state courts have
power to award damages in tort suit based on malicious defamation in labor dis-
pute). Accord, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (def-
amation must be malicious within the standard established in New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
30. Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
31. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See DeMalherbe v. International Union of Elevator
Constructors, 438 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
32. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183 (1967).
33. Id. at 185-86. In Vaca, the Court stated that the decision to preempt state
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In addition to the above-mentioned judicial exceptions, Con-
gress has created four statutory exceptions to the doctrine of fed-
eral preemption of labor disputes. First, section 303 of the LMRA
creates a cause of action for property owners injured by union ac-
tivity constituting an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (4)
of the NLRA.34 The injured property owner may sue either in fed-
eral district court or in state court. The NLRB's jurisdiction and
both state and federal court jurisdiction are concurrent under this
section.
Second, under section 14(c) of the NLRA, Congress created
residual state jurisdiction.35 Section 14(c) (2) provides that
"[n]othing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent or bar any
agency or the courts of any State ... from assuming and assert-
ing jurisdiction over labor disputes which the Board declines...
jurisdiction over a given class of cases must depend upon the nature of the partic-
ular interests being asserted and their effect upon the administration of national
labor policies of permitting the state courts to proceed. Id. at 180.
34. Section 303 of the LMVRA provides as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purposes of this section only, in an in-
dustry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage
in any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section
8(b) (4) of [the National Labor Relations Act, as amended].
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
any violation of subsection (a) may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 301
hereof without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court
having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him
sustained and the cost of the suit.
LMRA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976). See Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252
(1964). See also UMW v. Osborne Mining Co., Inc., 279 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 881 (1960) (no cause of action under § 303 where the relationship
to union activity is too remote).
35. Section 14(c) of the NLRA provides as follows:
(1) The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published
rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to
assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category
of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor
dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise
of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board shall not decline to assert ju-
risdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction
under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
(2) Nothing in this Act, shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or
the courts of any State or Territory (including the Commonwealth of Pu-
erto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands), from assuming and asserting ju-
risdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to
paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction.
NLRA § 14(c), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1976). Congress enacted § 14(c) in response to
the dilemma created when the NLRB had jurisdiction to affect a labor dispute but
declined to exercise it and the states lacked jurisdiction to do so. See Guss v. Utah
Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
to assert jurisdiction" over. The NLRB may decline to assert ju-
risdiction if it determines that the effect of the labor dispute on
interstate commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant ex-
ercise of its jurisdiction.3 6
Third, section 14(b) of the NLRA grants states the power to en-
act laws prohibiting union security agreements. 37 In Retail Clerks
Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn,38 the Supreme Court held that the
state courts have the power to declare negotiated union shop
agreements void and to enjoin their enforcement. The Court, in
attempting to reconcile its decision in Garmon with its decision in
Schermerhorn, stated that when a union security clause is negoti-
ated in violation of the state's law, the state court has jurisdiction
over any dispute arising under the clause.39 Furthermore, states
have the right to apply traditional forms of process to effectuate
their own labor policies. 40
The fourth statutory exception arises under section 301 of the
LMRA.41 Section 301 permits parties to a collective bargaining
agreement to sue in either state or federal court for enforcement
of the agreement. In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770,42 Boys Markets sought to enjoin a strike which violated the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court
found that, under the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the grievance was subject to arbitration. Section 8 of the
NLRA arguably prohibited the union's activity in Boys Markets.
Therefore, direct application of Garmon would have resulted in
federal preemption. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the state's
power to enjoin the strike.4 3 The Court reasoned that the central
36. Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast Serv.,
Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965); NLRB v. Children's Baptist Home, 576 F.2d 256 (9th Cir.
1978).
37. Section 14(b) states as follows: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as
authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which
execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law." NLRA § 14(b),
29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976).
38. 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
39. Id. at 103.
40. Id. at 102.
41. Section 301 of the LMIRA provides as follows:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor or-
ganization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.
LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
42. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
43. Id. See also Kramer, Injunctive Relief Under Section 301 of the Labor Man.
agement Relations Act, in LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 237 (1978).
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purpose of the NLRA is not sacrificed by the limited use of equi-
table state remedies to further the important congressional policy
of peaceful resolution of labor disputes.44
Commentators predicted that the Supreme Court would even-
tually have to decide whether to create an exception for labor dis-
putes involving arguably protected or prohibited union activity
that violated state trespass law.4 5 The trespass-preemption issue
is complicated by constitutional considerations and by issues con-
cerning the rights of private property owners. These considera-
tions delayed a Supreme Court ruling on this issue.
Trespassory Union Activity-The Next Exception
The regulation of trespassory union activity creates a conflict
between traditional notions of the rights of private property own-
ers and a union's need for effective communication. 4 6 Private
property owners do not have an absolute right to exclude nonem-
ployees and their unions from their property. In NLRB v. Bab-
cock & Wilcox Co.,47 the Supreme Court held that an employer
may ban nonemployees from distributing union literature if the
nonemployees have reasonable alternate channels of communica-
tion. The Court indicated, however, that this right must yield if
the nonemployees' reasonable attempts to communicate with
otherwise inaccessible employees through the usual channels are
ineffective.4A8 Hence, under Babcock an employer has only a qual-
ified right to exclude a union from his property.
At one time, the conflict between private property rights and
section 7 rights was thought to involve first amendment free
speech considerations, 49 further complicating the trespass-pre-
44. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See Na-
tional Rejectors Indus. v. United Steelworkers, 562 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978).
45. Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction Over Concerted Trespassory
Union Activity, 83 HAnv. L. REV. 552 (1970); Coy, Labor Law Preemption Re-
visited, 85 HAav. L. REV. 1337 (1972); Hooton, The Exceptional Garmon Doctrine,
26 LAB. L.J. 49 (1975).
46. R. GoRmAN, LABOR LAW: UNIoNizAToN AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINNG 179-93
(1976).
47. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
48. Id. at 112.
49. First amendment free speech issues complicate the trespass-preemption
issue because the Supreme Court at one time characterized picketing as a
"speech-plus" activity. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). The Court
dramatically changed its position in Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284
emption issue. Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc.5 0 represents the Supreme Court's first major attempt to re-
solve the conflict. In Logan Valley, the state court enjoined a
union's peaceful picketing at a privately owned shopping center.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the
picketing constituted a trespass under state law.5 ' The United
States Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court characterized the union's picketing as an
exercise of its first amendment free speech rights. The Court held
that the owners of the shopping center could not prevent the
union from exercising its first amendment rights even though the
exercise of those rights would violate state trespass law.5 2 The
Court was able to find the requisite state action by stating that
the owners had dedicated the center's walkways, streets, and
parking lots to public use. 3 Four years later the Supreme Court
implicitly retreated from this position in Central Hardware Co. v.
NLRB.54
In Central Hardware, the NLRB, relying on Logan Valley, en-
joined a union from soliciting on Central Hardware's private prop-
erty.SS The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.5 6
The Supreme Court rejected the union's argument that it had a
constitutional right to solicit Central Hardware's employees on
the store's private property.5 7 The Court found Logan Valley in-
applicable. The Court tenuously distinguished Logan Valley
from Central Hardware on the ground that Logan Valley rested
on principles of constitutional law rather than on principles of la-
bor law.5 8 The Court remanded Central Hardware for considera-
tion under its decision in Babcock.5 9
In Hudgens v. NLRB,60 the Supreme Court effectively overruled
Logan Valley. In Hudgens, the warehouse employees struck and
(1957). States are generally free to regulate picketing for any purpose or in any
reasonable fashion other than a blanket policy banning all picketing. But see
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) (thought to bring
vitality back to Thornhill).
50. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
51. Id. at 313.
52. Id. at 314.
53. Id. at 318.
54. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
55. Central Hardware, 181 NLRB 491 (1970).
56. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1971).
57. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1972).
58. Id. The Central Hardware Court, in dicta, stated that the rule in Babcock
allows an intrusion onto property if the intrusion is necessary to facilitate the ex-
ercise of the employees' § 7 rights. Id. at 545.
59. Id. See also Jarvis, Organization Campaigns: Private Rights vs. Public
Rights, in N.Y.U. 26T ANwuAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 13 (1974).
60. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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picketed the employer's retail store, which was located in a pri-
vately owned shopping center. The union filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges when the shopping center owners threatened to have
union members arrested for trespassing. The Supreme Court
held that despite the shopping center's public nature, it was not a
governmental agency. Therefore, the owners were not subject to
the proscriptions of the first amendment. The union did not have
a constitutional right to picket.61
The Court recognized that the basic objective of the NLRA is
the accommodation of section 7 rights with the rights of private
property owners with as little destruction of one as is consistent
with the maintenance of the other.62 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, went on to state that the locus of that accommodation may
fall at differing points along the spectrum depending upon the na-
ture and strength of the respective section 7 rights and private
property rights asserted in any given context.63
The Supreme Court, in effect, established that under certain cir-
cumstances nonemployee union representatives have a right pro-
tected under section 7 to enter the employer's premises and to
commit a trespass in violation of state law. The difficulty is dis-
cerning when a trespass is protected. If the trespass is not pro-
tected by the NLRA, then, a fortiori, the employer has a right to
exclude the union. It is at this juncture that the trespass-preemp-
tion issue arises.
Theoretically, an employer has three means of enforcing his
right to exclude a union from his private property. First, an em-
ployer can use self-help.64 Relying on basic principles of tort law,
the employer can use reasonable force to remove the union from
his premises. 65 However, this is not an effective method of enforc-
ing an employer's right to exclude a union from his property be-
cause the employer would be exposed to unfair labor charges or
to liability for damages suffered by the union as a result of an
eviction with unreasonable force.6 6
61. Id. at 521.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See generally Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction Over Concerted
Trespassory Union Activity, 83 HARv. L. REV. 552, 568 (1970).
65. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 21, at 113-17 (4th ed.
1971).
66. Id.
Second, an employer can enforce his right to exclude a union
from his property by filing unfair labor charges in hopes of secur-
ing relief from the NLRB.67 The effectiveness of this alternative
depends upon the nature of the union's conduct. The employer
must be able to prove that the union's conduct constitutes an un-
fair labor practice. If, after the charges are filed, the NLRB's re-
gional attorney determines that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the charges are valid, a temporary restraining order
enjoining the activity may be sought from the federal district
court.6 8 If the NLRB finally determines that the union's conduct
constitutes an unfair labor practice, the Board is empowered to is-
sue a cease and desist order enjoining the union.69
Third, an employer can sue in state court for an injunction
against the union's alleged trespassory actiity.70 If the union's
conduct is arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA, the is-
sue of whether the state court jurisdiction is preempted under
Garmon is raised. Prior to Sears, the probability of success of su-
ing in state court depended upon how the particular state court
had ruled on the issue.
The state courts split on the trespass-preemption issue in the
absence of guidance from the Supreme Court.71 In Meat Cutters
v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc.,72 the Supreme Court left open the tres-
pass-preemption issue. The Court had a second opportunity to
decide the issue when it granted a writ of certiorari in Taggart v.
Weinrackers, Inc.73 However, the Court eventually dismissed
Taggart, stating that the record had become obscured and only
remnants of the original dispute remained. 74 The Supreme Court
finally faced the trespass-preemption issue in Sears, Roebuck &
67. NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C § 160(a) (1976).
68. Id. § 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976).
69. Id. § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
70. See generally Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction Over Concerted
Trespassory Union Activity, 83 Hnv. L. RV. 552, 568 (1970).
71. State court decisions holding that state court jurisdiction over arguably
protected trespassory union activity was not federally preempted include Musi-
cians Union Local 6 v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. 2d 695, 447 P.2d 313, 73 Cal. Rptr. 201
(1968); Reece Shirley & Ron's, Inc. v. Retail Store Employees, 22 Kan. 373, 565 P.2d
585 (1977); Freeman v. Retail Clerks Local 1207, 58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803
(1961). For state court decisions holding that state court jurisdiction is not pre-
empted, see May Dep't Stores Co. v. Teamsters Local 743, 64 Ill. 2d 153, 355 N.E.2d
7 (1976); People v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529, 349 N.E.2d 832, 384 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1976);
Hood v. Stafford, 213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964).
72. 353 U.S. 20, 24-25 (1957).
73. 283 Ala. 171, 214 So. 2d 913 (1968), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 813 (1969), cert. dis-
missed, 397 U.S. 223 (1970). See also Schwartz-Torrence Inv. Corp. v. Bakery &
Confectionery Workers' Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233
(1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965).
74. 283 Ala. 171, 214 So. 2d 913 (1968), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 813 (1969), cert. dis.
missed, 397 U.S. 223, 226 (1970).
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Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters.75
THE SEARS EXCEPTION TO GARMON
The Facts of Sears 76
In Sears, the respondent, San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters (Union), and the Building Trades Council of San Di-
ego County had entered into a master labor agreement concern-
ing the use and dispatch of carpenters. The petitioner, Sears,
Roebuck & Co. (Sears), was having carpentry work performed at
its store in Chula Vista, California, by workers who had not been
dispatched by the Union hiring hall. Two Union business repre-
sentatives determined that the work was within the ambit of the
master labor agreement and that the men Sears had hired came
within the classification of journeymen carpenters.
The Union demanded either that Sears contract the work
through a Building Trades contractor who would have used
union-dispatched carpenters or that Sears agree to sign a short
form agreement to abide by the terms of the master labor agree-
ment. Sears neither accepted nor rejected the Union's requests,
despite the Union's repeated inquiries over the next two days.
Sears' unresponsiveness caused the Union to establish picket
lines on Sears' private property. The pickets patrolled either the
walkways next to the store or the adjacent parking lot. The pick-
eting was at all times peaceful, involving no threat of violence or
obstruction of traffic. The Union refused Sears' requests to re-
move the pickets. The Union's business representative stated
that the Union would remove the pickets only if ordered to do so
by the courts.
Sears filed suit in the Superior Court of California to have the
pickets enjoined. The court granted Sears' motion for a tempo-
rary restraining order, enjoining the Union from picketing on
Sears' private property. The Union promptly ceased picketing
and began patrolling the public sidewalks nearest the store. Soon
thereafter the Union discontinued the picketing because it was
75. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
76. The nature of the labor dispute involved in the Sears fact situation clearly
warranted federal preemption under Garmon. Id. at 215 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The facts are significant because there are no unusual facts or circumstances
involved. As Justice Brennan stated, Sears is a "classic one for preemption." Id.
at 224.
too far removed from the store to be effective.
The superior court granted Sears' motion for a preliminary in-
junction, restraining the Union from causing, instigating, further-
ing, participating in, or carrying on picketing on plaintiff's
property. The California Court of Appeal afflrmed.77 The court of
appeal rested its decision on two grounds. First, the court con-
cluded that Central Hardware was controlling.7 8 The court stated
that the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution did not protect the Union's picketing. Second, the
court determined that state law did not prohibit the injunction.79
The court of appeal rejected the Union's contention that the
dispute involved labor activity arguably protected by section 8 of
the NLRA and that therefore the state court lacked jurisdiction
under Garmon.80 The court concluded that illegal trespassory
picketing fell within the "deeply rooted" exception to Garmon,
despite the picketing's arguably protected nature.81 The Union
appealed to the California Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that Garmon
directly controlled the case.82 The court concluded that the
union's activity was both arguably protected under section 7 of
the LMRA83 and arguably prohibited by section 8 of the LMRA.4
77. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 52
Cal. App. 3d 690, 125 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1975). (This decision has been deleted from
the official reporter. Consequently, citations to the California Court of Appeal de-
cision in this case will be solely to the California Reporter.)
78. Id., 125 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
79. Id. at 252. California law had adopted the position that under certain cir-
cumstances, the use of trespass laws in labor controversies would have no rele-
vance to the function of the NLRB. Therefore, the state's power to enjoin
trespasses would not interfere with NLRB jurisdiction over the merits of the labor
controversy. Musicians Local 6 v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. 2d 695, 447 P.2d 313, 73
Cal. Rptr. 201 (1968) (citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S.
53, 63 (1966)).
80. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 125
Cal. Rptr. 245, 249 (1975).
81. Id.
82. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 17
Cal. 3d 893, 907, 553 P.2d 603, 613, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443, 453 (1976).
83. The California Supreme Court concluded that the Union had two purposes
in picketing Sears. First the Union sought to secure work for the Union's mem-
bers. Second, the Union wanted to publicize Sears' undercutting of wages below
prevailing area standards for the employment of carpenters. Id. at 899, 553 P.2d at
609, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 448. In Musicians Local 6 v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. 2d 695, 447
P.2d 313, 73 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1968), the court had recognized that a labor union seek-
ing to broaden the employment opportunities of its members pursues an objective
arguably protected by § 7 as an activity for the employees' mutual aid or protec-
tion. Picketing for an employees' mutual aid or protection is a classic form of con-
certed activity within the meaning of § 7. In Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne
Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1970), the United States Supreme Court held
that primary area standards picketing was protected under § 7.
84. The California Supreme Court concluded that the Union's activity may
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The state court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the contro-
versy. Sears successfully petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court reversed.
The Sears Decision
The Supreme Court's decision in Sears rests on two significant
premises. First, the Court accepted the California Court of Ap-
peal's determination that the location of the Union's picketing vio-
lated state trespass law.85 This premise is significant because if
the NLRA did not arguably protect or prohibit the Union's picket-
ing, then the superior court had jurisdiction and state grounds to
properly enjoin the Union. Second, the Court concluded that the
picketing was both arguably prohibited and arguably protected by
the Act.86 This premise is significant because, having once
reached this conclusion, strict application of Garmon would have
resulted in federal preemption of the dispute.
In resolving the Garmon issue, the Sears Court analyzed the
arguably prohibited branch of the Garmon doctrine and the ar-
guably protected branch of the doctrine separately.87 The Court
stated that the arguably prohibited branch of Garmon was
designed to avoid a risk of state interference with the NLRB's un-
have been arguably prohibited by § 8. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 17 Cal. 3d 893, 900, 553 P.2d 603, 609, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 443, 449 (1976). The court reasoned that the Union's request that Sears sign a
short form agreement is evidence of a recognitional purpose. Section 8(b) (7) of
the NLRA generally prohibits recognitional picketing. Had the Union been permit-
ted to continue to picket for 30 days without having filed a petition for representa-
tion election, the Union would have violated § 8(b) (7).
85. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 185 (1978).
86. Id. at 187. The Sears Court reasoned that § 8 would arguably prohibit the
Union's picketing if the Union entertained one of two purposes. First, if the Union
intended to force Sears to assign the carpentry work away from its employees to
Union members dispatched from the hiring hall, § 8(b) (4) (D) would arguably pro-
hibit the Union's activity. Id. at 185-86. Second, if the Union's purpose in picketing
was to coerce Sears into signing a prehire or members-only type of agreement
with the Union, the picketing was at least arguably prohibited by § 8(b) (7) (c)
which prohibits recognitional picketing. Id. at 186.
According to the Court, if, as the California Supreme Court concluded, the
Union's objective was to compel Sears to abide by area standards, then the picket-
ing was protected by § 7. Id. at 186-87.
87. The Court noted that although the considerations underlying the two
branches overlap, the branches still differ significantly so as to warrant separate
analyses. Id. at 190.
fair labor practice jurisdiction when the same controversy is
presented to a state court.88 The Court held that the critical in-
quiry is whether the controversy presented is identical to or dif-
ferent from the controversy which could have been, but was not,
presented to the NLRB.89
With respect to the arguably protected branch of Garmon, the
Court held that the mere fact that the Union's trespass was argua-
bly protected is insufficient reason to deprive the state courts of
jurisdiction.90 The Court advanced two reasons for this holding.
First, the Court reasoned that Garmon's primary jurisdiction ra-
tionale "does not provide a sufficient justification for preempting
jurisdiction over arguably protected conduct when the party who
could have presented the protection issue to the Board has not
done so and the other party to the dispute has no acceptable
means of doing so."91 Second, the Court reasoned that "permit-
ting state courts to evaluate the merits of an argument that cer-
tain trespassory activity is protected does not create an
unacceptable risk of interference with conduct which the Board,
and a court reviewing the Board's decision, would find pro-
tected".92
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SEARS
The Arguably Protected Aspect of Sears
The Sears Court's major concern was to bridge the gap created
by the interaction of Garmon, Babcock, and Hudgens, wherein an
employer could not effectively challenge trespassory union activ-
ity. If an employer sought relief from a state court, the state court
would have to determine whether the trespass was protected.
However, strict application of Garmon would result in federal
preemption of the lawsuit.93 The difficulty was that the employer
could take only the trespass issue to the NLRB if the employer
interfered with the union's activity, thereby forcing the union to
file unfair labor practice charges.94 However, if the union chose
not to file charges, the employer property owner was without a
remedy. The employer was in a "no-man's land."
Sears effectively establishes a remedy by excepting state juris-
88. Id. at 197.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 200.
91. Id. at 202-03.
92. Id. at 205.
93. Id. at 215 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Broomfield, Preemptive Fed-
eral Jurisdiction Over Concerted Trespassory Union Activity, 83 HARv. L. REv. 552,
563 (1970).
94. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
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diction over union activity violative of state trespass law from
NLRB preemption. In order to achieve this result, the Sears
Court was forced to find Garmon inapplicable. The Court held
that when an employer is without a remedy and is unable to pre-
sent the protection issue to the NLRB, Garmon's primary juris-
diction rationale does not warrant preemption.9 5
However, even assuming, arguendo, that the Court was correct
in finding that Garmon's primary jurisdiction rationale does not
provide sufficient justification for preempting state jurisdiction,
Garmon's second rationale was to avoid the danger of state court
interference with federally protected conduct.96 In order to cir-
cumvent this aspect of Garmon, the Sears Court was forced to
conclude that state court evaluation of the merits of an argument
that certain trespassory union activity is protected does not cre-
ate an unacceptable risk of state interference with federal labor
policy.97
The Court based its conclusions on three considerations. First,
the Court found trespassory union activity rarely to be pro-
tected.98 Second, unions have a reasonable means of bringing the
protection issue to the NLRB.99 Third, the concern for the em-
ployer's "no-man's land" dilemma outweighed any risk of an erro-
neous state court adjudication.OO A critical evaluation of these
three considerations indicates insufficient support for the Court's
holding.
Addressing the first consideration, the Court summarily stated
that "while there are unquestionably examples of trespassory
union activity in which the question whether it is protected is
fairly debatable, experience under the act teaches that.., a tres-
pass is far more likely to be unprotected."Ol The Sears Court's
conclusion is both objectionable and erroneous.
The Court's decision is objectionable in that the Court disre-
gards the purpose and effect of the Garmon doctrine-the pre-
emption of state jurisdiction over disputes involving activity in
95. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 202 (1978).
96. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
97. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 205 (1978).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 207.
100. Id. at 206.
101. Id. at 205.
"which the question whether it is protected is fairly debatable"
(that is, arguably protected activity). The Sears Court's decision
is erroneous in that the Court, without citing authority, assumes
that a trespass is more likely to be unprotected. The Court fails
to recognize that the only trespassory union activity that clearly
will be unprotected involves mass picketing, violence, or obstruc-
tion.10 2 Under these circumstances, the Garmon doctrine does
not deny an employer the opportunity to obtain injunctive relief
and damages from the state courts.10 3 Furthermore, if the union
is engaged in trespassory picketing with an objective prohibited
by section 8(b), the employer may file an unfair labor practice
charge. The NLRB is empowered in such instances to issue cease
and desist orders. 0 4
In addressing the second consideration, the Court stated that
unions have an adequate opportunity to present the protection is-
sue to the NLRB for determination. 0 5 The NLRB, as amicus cu-
riae, took the position before the Sears Court that it would
consider an employer's mere act of informing the union that it
was not permitted on the employer's property a sufficient interfer-
ence with section 7 rights to warrant the issuance of a section
8(a) (1) complaint.'0 6 The NLRB's position theoretically narrows
the gap because it makes it easier for the union to file unfair labor
practice charges.
The Court erroneously assumes that when a union has a strong
argument that its trespassory activity is in fact protected, the
union will, in fact, file unfair labor practice charges. In effect, the
Court has placed the burden of raising the protection issue on the
union. The union must now protect itself from erroenous state
adjudications. By placing the burden on the union to raise the
protection issue before the NLRB, the Sears Court has created se-
rious procedural and policy problems.
The union's filing of unfair labor charges against the employer
102. See text accompanying notes 23-30 supra.
103. Id.
104. Section 10(c) of the NLRA provides that:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of
the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is
engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its
findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an
order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor
practice ....
NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
105. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 207 (1978).
106. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board as Amicus Curiae at 18,
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180
(1978).
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with the NLRB creates two significant procedural problems. First,
if the charges are filed prior to the employer's filing of an action in
state court, will the state court's jurisdiction be preempted? Sec-
ond, if the union fies charges subsequent to the employer's filing
of an action in state court, will state court proceedings be stayed?
Furthermore, what will be the effect of subsequently filed unfair
labor practice charges on temporary, preliminary, or final state
court orders? 107 The majority opinion leaves these problems un-
resolved. Absent guidance from the Supreme Court, lower fed-
eral courts and state courts will inevitably reach different
resolutions of these procedural problems. Procedural differences
will produce substantive differences, thereby interfering with uni-
form national labor policies.10 8
Placing the burden of taking the protection issue to the NLRB
on the union by forcing it to file unfair labor practice charges cre-
ates serious policy problems as well. The Court simply assumes
that because a union could file unfair labor practice charges
against an employer, the union will fie such charges. This as-
sumption ignores any economic or strategic considerations that
play a part in a union's decision to file charges.109 A union may
have insufficient funds to become embroiled in litigation. The
union will then be forced to discontinue what may otherwise be
protected activity.
With respect to the third consideration, the Court stated:
Whatever risk of an erroneous state court adjudication does exist is out-
weighed by the anomalous consequence of a rule which would deny the
employer access to any forum in which to litigate either the trespass issue
or the protection issue in those cases in which the disputed conduct is
least likely to be protected by § 7.110
The Sears Court erroneously assumes that the damage incurred
by the employer as a result of the unremedied peaceful picketing
exceeds the damage that the union will suffer if its protected ac-
tivity is enjoined.
Traditionally, mere infringement of general property rights has
been insufficient damage to warrant complete denial of union ac-
107. Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion stated that as a logical corol-
lary of the majority's decision, state jurisdiction will be preempted in both situa-
tions. Id. at 209. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
108. See id. at 233 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. See generally K. McGumss, How TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, chs. 13-14 (4th ed. 1975).
110. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 206-07 (1978).
cess to the employer's private property."' Employers may not
absolutely ban employee solicitation.112 Furthermore, an em-
ployer must afford nonemployees access to his property under
certain circumstances. 113 Thus, the Court has recognized that ef-
fective communication is necessary for the protection, preserva-
tion, and exercise of section 7 rights.
In contradistinction, the Court has in the past denied or at least
circumscribed employee and union access to an employer's pri-
vate property if the employer can demonstrate that denial of em-
ployee or union access is necessary for efficiency, safety,
discipline, or legitimate business purposes." 4 In these excep-
tional circumstances, the Court has recognized that the em-
ployer's right to be free from trespass outweighs a union's need
for access to employees. The Sears Court attempted to bring its
decision within the ambit of these exceptional circumstances.
However, in its analysis, the Court fails to identify why the risk of
state court adjudication and the resulting detriment to the union
is outweighed by the employer's right to be free from trespass.
Unions suffer both tangible and intangible damage when labor
activity is enjoined. One major difficulty is that the efficacy of
union activity greatly depends on how, where, and when the ac-
tivity takes place.115 If an injunction against union activities
forces the union to engage in the enjoined activities in another
manner, in another place, or at a different time, the efficacy of the
union's activity may be greatly reduced. This reduction in the ef-
ficacy of the union's activity is repugnant to Congress' goals in in-
itially enacting federal labor law.116
The Arguably Prohibited Aspect of Sears
The Sears Court stated that the reasons federal preemption of
state jurisdiction is normally appropriate when union activity is
111. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
112. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
113. See text accompanying notes 46-63 supra.
114. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1973); Marshal
Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1953); Stoddard Quirk Mfg. Co., 138
NLRB 615 (1962); Peyton Packing Co., 49 NLRB 828 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944).
115. The facts in Sears illustrate this point. After the superior court issued an
injunction, Sears removed the pickets to the public sidewalks. The Union eventu-
ally removed the pickets because the picketing was too far removed from the store
and thus ineffective. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
116. See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
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arguably prohibited do not apply to trespassory union activity."17
The Court justifies this conclusion by further stating that only if
the controversy presented to the state court is identical to that
which could have been presented to the NLRB is there a risk of
state court interference with NLRB jurisdiction."18
The Sears Court erroneously assumes that if the controversy
presented to the state court differs from the controversy which
could be presented to the NLRB, one avoids the risk of state in-
terference with NLRB jurisdiction. The Court mistakenly con-
tends that the risk of state interference with NLRB jurisdiction is
avoided because the state court in deciding the trespass issue
does not have to make "relatively complex factual and legal deter-
ninations completely unrelated to the simple question whether a
trespass had occurred.""19
The Court errs in assuming that the state court, in deciding the
state trespass issue, need not make complex factual and legal de-
terminations under federal labor laws. As previously noted, un-
der Babcock and Hudgens, the employer may have only a
qualified right to exclude the union from his private property.120
The state court in deciding the trespass issue must necessarily
determine whether the union had reasonable alternative means of
communication. This determination clearly involves complex fac-
tual and legal issues similar to those often decided by the
NLRB.121 Where did the picketing take place on the employer's
property? How effective was the communication? What was the
union's purpose in trying to communicate with employees of the
employers?
A state court must look to the NLRB decision and criteria in or-
der to determine the protected nature of the trespassory picket-
ing. A state court may have a predisposed attitude towards
organized labor, or the court may lack expertise in labor law.
These two factors may cause a state court to misconceive or mis-
117. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 198 (1978).
118. Id. at 197.
119. Id. at 198.
120. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
121. See Electrical Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961); Na-
tional Maritime v. NLRB, 367 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 959
(1967); Scot Hudgens, 230 NLRB 414 (1977).
apply the NLRB decision or criteria.122 The state court in fact
does run a risk of enjoining protected activity. This is the very re-
sult which Garmon sought to avoid.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Sears is of considerable legal
consequence for two reasons. First, the decision has a significant
impact on the ability of employees to exercise their section 7
rights effectively. Second, the decision has a significant impact on
the current validity of the Garmon doctrine.
The Sears decision has a significant impact on employees' abili-
ties to exercise their section 7 rights effectively because the deci-
sion does not make a proper accommodation of those rights and
the rights of private property owners as required under Babcock.
Employees' rights to self-organize, to form, join, and assist labor
organizations, and to engage in concerted activities depend on ef-
fective communication. Moreover, the union's ability to reach
other employees and members of the public should not be unduly
restricted. When protected union activity is improperly enjoined
as a result of the application of state trespass law, the efficacy of
union activity is impaired. This result is repugnant to the pur-
pose of the NLRA in light of the minimal damage or impairment
to employers' property rights.
Sears has a significant impact on the current validity of the
Garmon doctrine. The Supreme Court created a new exception
for trespassory union activity rather than finding that trespassory
union conduct fell within one of the preexisting exceptions as did
the California Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court's rationale in
Sears completely disregards the very purpose and effect of the
Garmon doctrine. Although the Sears Court did not overrule the
Garmon doctrine, the exception created by the Court in Sears
signals the doctrine's demise.
TERRY FLETI'
122. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 224 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
